La guerra de Georgia de 2008 y el proceso de transformación del Ejército Ruso
Resumen
la campaña llevada a cabo en 2008 por el Ejército Ruso en las regiones de Abjasia y Osetia del Sur, en Georgia, tuvo como objetivo la anexión de estas dos regiones con el objetivo estratégico de constituir una zona de contención para la implicación de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) en cuestiones de Oriente Medio. La valoración que hicieron las autoridades rusas tras el conflicto apuntaba a una posibilidad de transformación de las capacidades militares del Ejército Ruso. Se identificaron tres temas clave: tecnología de armas, tecnologías de información y comunicación y la estructura de fuerza empleada en la campaña de Georgia. Por lo tanto, el artículo se centra en un análisis de estos temas clave, así como los antecedentes que hicieron que las autoridades rusas se dieran cuenta de las necesidades de transformación de su ejército. Por tanto, se utiliza una investigación cualitativa basada en una revisión bibliográfica entre 2008 y 2014, además de la consulta de documentos primarios relacionados con la defensa y la seguridad rusas durante estos años.
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