Poder militar y disuasión convencional

revisión de la literatura

Resumen

Esta revisión de la literatura explica la forma en que las estrategias de disuasión y coacción (compellence) se relacionan con el poder militar. Tal investigación es pertinente, puesto que gran parte de la literatura sobre la difusión del poder militar se centra exclusivamente en las plataformas militares y en los sistemas de armas. Por lo tanto, se promueve un enfoque más político y estratégico en lugar de un enfoque más tecnológico al evaluar el poder militar. En el artículo, se utiliza “costos” y “probabilidad de éxito” para evaluar la disuasión convencional. Aunque tanto la coacción como la disuasión son estrategias coercitivas, tienen diferentes implicaciones para la difusión del poder militar, en especial por los costos asociados a cada una. También se argumenta que los países no deberían replicar o copiar todas las plataformas principales y sistemas de armas avanzados de un estado líder para actualizarse o negar las ventajas de la innovación tecnológica. En consecuencia, las estrategias de negación son mucho más económicas que las estrategias de control. Por último, las estrategias de negación a menudo disminuyen la probabilidad de éxito en el campo de batalla de una ofensiva de la fuerza expedicionaria. Se concluye que el poder militar debe relacionarse mucho más con la disuasión que con la coacción para contrarrestar la noción convencional de Dahl de que el poder es la capacidad de “A” para hacer que “B” haga algo que “B” de otro modo no haría. En otras palabras, el poder militar debe verse como “A” convenciendo a “B” de no iniciar una acción específica porque los beneficios percibidos para “B” no justifican los costos y riesgos potenciales.

Biografía del autor/a

Augusto C. Dall'Agnol, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Ph.D. candidate in Strategic Studies at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. President of the South American Institute for Politics and Strategy. Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Érico E. Duarte, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Ph.D. in Strategic Studies at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Adjunct professor at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Porto Alegre, Brazil.

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Biografía del autor/a

Augusto C. Dall'Agnol, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Ph.D. candidate in Strategic Studies at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. President of the South American Institute for Politics and Strategy. Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Érico E. Duarte, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Ph.D. in Strategic Studies at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Adjunct professor at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Porto Alegre, Brazil.

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Cómo citar
Dall’Agnol, A. C., & E. Duarte, Érico. (2022). Poder militar y disuasión convencional: revisión de la literatura. Revista De Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia Y Seguridad, 17(1), 101-118. https://doi.org/10.18359/ries.5793
Publicado
2022-06-30
Sección
Artículos

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