Un equilibrio bayesiano de Nash: competencia a la Cournot bajo información asimétrica y productos diferenciados

Abstract

This article is a theoretical contribution in two fields of economics: game theory and industrial organization. In this article Nash-Cournot Bayesian equilibrium is calculated when two companies compete on produced quantities. One of the companies has full information on its costs and its competitor, but the other company just knows its own costs and assigns probabilities to possible costs of its competitor. Produced goods by the companies can be from completely homogeneous to completely heterogeneous. Product substitution degree determines the equilibrium effects, of both own costs and other company's costs in equilibrium quantities. The comparative static analysis of balance indicates that own costs for each company make that balance quantities decrease in a greater proportion when product substitution degree is higher. On the other hand, other company's costs increase balance quantities to the extent that products are more homogenous or replaceable.